Abstract Childhood genetic testing raises complex ethical and moral dilemmas for both families and professionals. In the family sphere, the role of communication is a key aspect in the transmission of 'genetic responsibility' between adults and children. In the professional sphere, genetic responsibility is an interactional accomplishment emerging from the sometimes competing views over what constitutes the 'best interests' of the child in relation to parental preferences on the one hand, and professional judgements on the other. In the present paper we extend our previous research into parental accounts of childhood genetic testing and explore the ethical accounts of professionals in research interviews. Interviews (n=20) were conducted with professional practitioners involved in the genetic diagnosis and management of children and their families. We first identify four interrelated themes-juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child's autonomy, elicitation of the child's autonomy, avoidance of parental responsibility and recognition of professional uncertainty. Then, using Rhetorical Discourse Analysis, we examine the range of discourse devices through which ethical accounts are situationally illustrated: contrast, reported speech, constructed dialogue, character and event work. An overarching device in these ethical accounts is the use of extreme case scenarios, which reconstruct dilemmas as justifications of professional conduct. While acknowledging ambivalence, our analysis suggests that professional judgement is not a simple matter of implementing ethical principles but rather of managing the practical conditions and consequences of interactions with parents and children. We conclude that more attention is needed to understand the way professional practitioners formulate judgements about ethical practice.
Introduction

Professional Accounts of Ethical Practice
Advances in medical/molecular genetics have led to an increasing availability of accurate tests for a range of heritable disorders. This will place new and more numerous demands on the relationship between clients' expectations and professionals' ethical concerns. Genetic testing will continue to raise ethical dilemmas about informed consent, about who can legitimately ask for a test, and how to negotiate competing responsibilities between families and professionals. On the family side, people already face complex choices and obligations about knowing or not knowing their genetic status (Chadwick 2004 ) as well as disclosing or not disclosing genetic information to relatives who may be equally ambivalent about their genetic future (Hallowell 1999 (Hallowell , 2003 Forrest et al. 2003) . The scenario becomes more complex when it involves the genetic testing of children, which is our focus here. The medical community has responded to these dilemmas by applying general ethical principles (e.g. maintaining confidentiality and respecting autonomy) to guide and inform professional conduct (Clarke 1994; Clarke and Flinter 1996) .
While ethical principles and guidelines have been wellreceived and well-understood by the medical profession, less is known about the practical ethical challenges they pose for genetic professionals. Few studies, for instance, have closely examined what communicative resources professionals use to engage in ethical deliberation and reflection. In this paper we investigate the accounts of professionals who have been involved in the genetic testing of children.
We argue that close examination of professional accounts of childhood testing provides useful insight into the assumptions and the descriptive and moral resources that professionals use to reflect upon ethical dilemmas. First, we underscore how professional accounts increase awareness and understanding of ethical dilemmas. Next, we describe our methodology and explain how Rhetorical Discourse Analysis of interview data helps in understanding the communicative resources professionals use to engage in ethical deliberation and reflection. We show that professional ambivalence emerges from formulations of difficult interactions with parents and children which require interactional expertise in one's attempt at reconciling competing ethical principles. This is followed by a broader discussion of our findings where we consider the implications of our analysis for professional development.
Professional Ethics and Genetic Counseling
There are very few published studies that examine professional dilemmas in the context of genetic counseling services; these include, for instance, Maley (1994) , Callahan et al. (1995 ), McCarthy Veach et al (2001 , and Bower et al (2002) . Callahan et al. (1995) combined case studies of professionals' experiences of ethical dilemmas with an extensive review of the clinical genetics literature. They concluded that professional understandings of ethical and social issues were superficial and generalized and that more attention was needed to identify and analyze common ethical themes in clinical genetics. Responding to this call, McCarthy Veach et al. (2001) conducted focus groups with genetic counselors, nurses and physicians, identifying 16 major categories and 63 subcategories of 'ethical and professional dilemmas'. The three most prevalent dilemmas cited were: 'informed consent', 'withholding information' and 'facing uncertainty'. In a follow-up study, Bower et al. (2002) applied these same categories in a survey (n=454) in order to develop ethical strategies for genetic counselors. The frequency and variety of challenges (esp. informed consent and value conflicts) implied that respondents recommended a more directive approach towards the process of genetic counseling. The authors argued for more research (e.g. individual interviews) to explore the use of dilemmaspecific strategies in different counseling situations, which aligns with the main aims of the present study.
Before we turn our attention to the present focus, it is worth acknowledging how early studies of genetic counseling have focussed on the nuances of risk communication which inevitably implicate dilemmas of ethnicity, gender and class (Rapp 1988 ). Bosk's (1992) study of a genetic counseling unit revealed that counselors placed such a high premium on 'correct information' and 'non-directiveness' that upholding client autonomy could lead to patient abandonment. While the principle of client autonomy is an important objective of genetic counseling, the right to choose or decide may be personally experienced as a moral and psychological burden (Hallowell 1999; Sarangi et al. 2009 ). Many studies have noted that, where ethical principles pull in different directions, there is very little guidance as to how particular situations should be managed by counselors 1 (Huibers and van 't Spijker 1998; van Berkel and van der Weele 1999; Wüstner 2003) . Focusing on real-life genetic counseling encounters, Pilnick (2002) also shows how principles of patient autonomy and non-directiveness are interactionally difficult to reconcile.
Ethical Dilemmas Surrounding Childhood Genetic Testing
The ethical dilemmas assume further significance when we turn our attention to childhood genetic testing. Since the mid-80s, the professional community have recognised the potential for inappropriate testing of healthy children (Craufurd and Harris 1986; Harper and Clarke 1990) . There are two kinds of tests for which guidelines have been developed, both of which raise quite different medical and ethical implications. Predictive/presymptomatic testing can forecast a person's risk of developing a particular disorder, while carrier testing raises reproductive implications for the future. Ethical guidelines clearly stipulate that genetic testing is recommended only if there is clear medical or psychosocial benefit to the child (Clinical Genetics Society 1994) . Part of the dilemma of offering testing to minors is the difficultly of demonstrating a psychosocial benefit. Despite the profession's clear ethical stand, studies attest to regular parental demands for predictive or carrier testing of healthy children (Chapple et al. 1996; Campbell et al. 2003) . After calls for further empirical research (Borry et al. 2006) , recent European surveys on carrier testing of 'incompetent children' indicate geographical and cultural variations in professional attitudes (Borry et al. 2007) .
As far as immediate stakeholders are concerned, dilemmas in childhood testing often reveal a three-party tension between parents, professionals, and children. Parents often cast professionals as gatekeepers of genetic information, while professionals may frame parental uncertainty and anxiety in terms of seeking psychological assurance or wanting to know their child's genetic status. In the professional context, respect for autonomy is central to debates about genetic testing of children (McConkie-Rosell et al. 1999; Hamann et al. 2000) , which presupposes the child's future right to self-determination over matters of health, reproduction and welfare. Ethical tensions arise when parental requests for genetic testing ignore the perspective of minors who are unable to provide informed consent or make independent choices. This generates difficulties for professionals who seek to advocate the child's autonomy without explicitly controlling client decisions. For instance, Sarangi and Clarke (2002) have explored the subtle negotiation between a clinician and a parent requesting childhood carrier testing. They illustrate the complexity of decision-making where taking a nondirective stance involves contrasting the child's future autonomy against the parent's current 'rights'. Such contrastive strategies allow the counselor to offer 'recommended options' without explicitly countering the parent's concerns. In the family context, parental explanations and descriptions of family communication reveal a precarious, and not always convincing, balance between parental responsibility and the child's autonomy. Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke (2008) have shown how parental accounts strategically portray a dialogic family which foregrounds child autonomy with regard to issues of deciding whether or not to test and how and when to disclose test results to children. In this paper we shift our attention to professional accounting practices which doubtless embed, as we will see, the perspectives of parents and children.
Methods
Following ethics committee approval, twenty participants were recruited from paediatric and genetic services in the United Kingdom. Both convenience and snowball sampling were used to contact professionals who, by either academic reputation or clinical experience, had worked on cases involving children and genetic services. Senior professionals were selected who had a long-standing experience of cases involving childhood testing and/or genetic counseling. The sample included paediatricians (n=10), clinical geneticists (n=2), and genetic counselors (n=8). Professionals were asked to provide retrospective accounts of difficult or challenging cases involving genetic testing of children. The interviewees were also asked to give explanations of their ethical reasoning and orientation about matters relating to the competence and maturity of children, the concept of autonomy, the ethical differences surrounding predictive and carrier testing, and the difficulties of practicing nondirective counseling.
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted to capture sufficient variation and complexity of ethical cases. Research interviews were treated as a social encounter, a joint accomplishment of the interviewer and the respondent (Dingwall 1997) . In other words, interviews were not treated as merely representing another time and space, but as a situated, linguistic activity of producing 'accounts'. By 'accounts' we mean the action-oriented communicative activity of reporting troubles or explaining problematic events persuasively so as to justify, excuse or defend the speaker's conduct (Antaki 1988) . All interviews were audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim.
We conducted our analysis in two phases. In the first phase, ethical cases were distinguished according to different and recurring themes using an iterative technique of close reading, note-taking, and coding. The coding criteria were based on the interactional aspects of 'reporting troubles' (Morris et al. 1994 ) vis-à-vis heritable risk and childhood testing. Accounts of professional and ethical dilemmas were also identified via categorizations of conduct and reported tensions between different participants (e.g. mothers, fathers, practitioners, children, etc.).
In the second phase, we selected from the material compiled under each theme the most illustrative and exemplary accounts for Rhetorical Discourse Analysis; this gave us a sub-corpus of 26 extracts. Unlike linguistic approaches, discourse analysis focuses on the pragmatic, functional and contextual use of language to accomplish interactional objectives and organise social activities (Roberts and Sarangi 2005) . A rhetorical approach (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008a, b) was preferred over other forms of discourse analysis because of its focus on the persuasive dimension of language use. Ethical deliberation and reflection is not a neutral or direct reporting of past events but reflects the speakers' current concerns of justifying professional conduct. Specifically, analysis entailed explicating a range of devices through which ethical/moral explanations were constructed: contrast, reported speech, constructed dialogue, character and event work. As Smith (1978) forcefully suggests, contrast structures are effective ways of not only categorising behaviour and identity but also establishing different versions of events. Constructed dialogue, or 'reported speech', is a strategic device widely used in accounts to recruit voices and authenticate different versions of events. Similarly, while character work may be strategically deployed as moral descriptions/categorisations of conduct in order to facilitate the adoption of a particular ethical perspective, event work offers a re-interpretation of temporal (past/future) occasions to suit the speaker's current concerns. Together, these devices reconstruct extreme case scenarios as accounts of ethical dilemmas.
Results and Analysis
The following themes emerged from our corpus which capture the range and variation of professional dilemmas: (1) Juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child's autonomy; (2) Elicitation of the child's autonomy; (3) Avoidance of parental responsibility; and (4) Recognition of professional uncertainty. Table 1 represents a summary, accompanied by an 'exemplar' account of each professional/ethical dilemma.
Let us briefly explain each of these themes and analyze the rhetorical/discoursal aspects of these professional accounts.
Juxtaposition of Parental Rights Vis-À-Vis Child's Autonomy
This well-rehearsed theme represented the most common dilemma in which parents were seeking or demanding a genetic test without considering the autonomy of the child. Parental rights were posed as a problem when they resisted or ignored the ethical, moral or psychological implications of childhood testing. Variations on this theme involved gender of the parent, the number of participants involved in the dilemma or the kind of attributions underlying parental motivations for childhood testing. In the simplest version of this dilemma, a single parent (usually the mother) becomes the principal figure of moral accounting. In the example below, a genetic counselor (GC) is describing a 'second referral' case involving a woman with Familial Adenomatous Polyposis (FAP) who 'came in wanting all five of her children tested'. The guidelines in Britain and Australia recommend that children at risk of FAP should be tested from approximately 10-12 years of age 2 : Extract 1 GC: I was referred to them as a second referral, and the approach of the person who had seen them had been very much, no, we don't do that-sorry, so she had become very cemented in this, I've got to have this test (.) she was also, to her credit, she was quite upfront about the reasons for that, it was very much for herself (.) she has Desmoid Disease where they develop benign tumours that develop and they grow (.) they're pretty much untreatable, managed with chemotherapy to keep them at a reasonable size (.) but the outlook for her wasn't particularly good, and so she was saying, I want to know what my children have, so that I can die in peace basically (.) it was for her anxiety and her worries about the future and wanting to know what was going to happen to her children.
There are two aspects of this account that are worth considering. Firstly, the framing of the case as one in which the mother was initially refused testing by another colleague conveys that such an initial refusal can aggravate tensions between parents and professionals. The account therefore serves as a cautionary tale for avoiding outright 
Juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child's autonomy
And they have two children of, I don't know, let's say six and eight. And the father is adamant that these two children should be tested, have carrier testing performed. And in that he's a very aggressive, pushy, difficult man Elicitation of the child's autonomy You ask a twelve year old a question that you might ask normal adult … You don't get a questionanswer-but when you chat to them and talk to them stuff comes out, bits and pieces, dribs and drabs, very frustrating, as a counselor, you're thinking it's taking so much time. And you don't know when it's going to come or how it's going to come.
Avoidance of parental responsibility
And I said look, you know, I'm feeling very uncomfortable about dealing with these issues with this girl because she came to the clinic on her own, these are big issues we've got to discuss, and I'm not clear why the family aren't supporting her. Recognition of professional uncertainty And I don't know because it is a bit of a struggle, there's part of me that wants him to recognise that what he's doing actually is about control, it's about his own anxiety and it actually isn't about the benefit of the children, is my belief, now I might be wrong refusal in practice. Secondly, it engages in the moral profiling of the mother who becomes 'cemented' on what she cannot have ('I've got to have this test'), which, as it transpires, is about assuaging her own fears. In our data corpus, counselors often reported that parental requests underscored the belief that childhood testing is a means of eliminating risk and of neutralising their fears, thus systematically ignoring the prospect that testing may indeed identify and confirm risk. Among the professionals we interviewed, the notion that childhood testing might be exploited as 'a means to an end' was rhetorically managed in a number of different ways. The counselor above had stipulated that arguments supporting parental requests for testing (on the grounds that the child would benefit from testing because it would relieve parental anxiety) were countered through this means-to-an-end rationale. In the next extract, we show how other rhetorical means are used to illustrate the dangers that may arise when the child's autonomy is ignored. In this more complex scenario, the professional (P) has just described her move from paediatrics to clinical genetics, and provides an account of a case from her early career. Just before narrating this account, she adds: 'I always tell this story in the lectures I give'. Extract 2 P: And I was completely not ready for this and they were sitting there (.) mother was a social worker and dad was a very uptight business man in a suit-or looked like a business man; very sort of uptight (.) and we were talking and this boy had got the help he needed in the school and he was needle phobic and they were sitting-and really a very sweet kid about-I don't know, thirteen, whatever (.) and-but young, very young (.) you know, because he was developmentally delayed (.) and the mother was saying look, you know, if these tests will do him good then you know, that's fine (.) but I really can't see-he's needle phobic, da-da-da-da (.) and what benefit will it be, da-da (.) anyway it transpired that they are actually getting divorced and the reason the father was there was that he'd been told by his sister who read a woman's magazine, that this is likely to be fragile X (.) if it was fragile X he could blame her, the soon-to-be-ex-wife, because it was carried by women and therefore he'd a) get custody of the child and b) get a better divorce settlement.
Quite different to the scenario of the 'anxious mother' in Extract 1, we have multiple participants as well as more explicit character work to infer parental motivation. The account begins by orienting the listener ('And I was completely not ready for this...') to an apparent breach of routine practice. P begins by assigning roles to the parents from which an estimation of character can be inferred: the mother who is 'a social worker', the father who is an 'uptight business man', which is nicely contrasted with the innocence of the child ('very sweet kid') who is cast at the centre of an adult dispute. The mother's ambivalence about testing is reproduced authentically with the use of reported speech ('but I really can't see -'), which is framed in terms of the child's best interests. The summary statement-'anyway it transpired'-draws our attention to further motivations (an excuse/justification for getting divorced) behind the reason for testing. The 'divorce' proceedings and the lay diagnosis of 'fragile X' by the father's sister 'who read a women's magazine' are effective in illustrating the cautionary tale that childhood testing can be deployed as a means to an end, in this case as an instrument of familial blame.
Elicitation of the Child's Autonomy
In the previous extracts we have seen that childhood testing is posed as a problem when parental rights threaten to supersede the child's autonomy. Now we consider examples in which the child's autonomy itself presents certain practical clinical challenges for professionals. We describe these dilemmas in terms of 'elicitation' because professional assessments of competence (i.e. the child's capacity to provide informed consent) rely on obtaining responses or displays of understanding from the child. Some genetic counselors described the difficulty of eliciting informed consent from children who fell somewhere between the category of 'minor' and 'adolescent'. Counseling at this grey zone of autonomy sometimes involved novel techniques of facilitating communication in less formal, public settings (e.g. visiting McDonalds). One genetic counselor (GC) described counseling twelve/ thirteen-year-olds as 'unbelievably difficult'; she was not convinced that they were 'making informed decisions in the way that an adult would'. In the account below, she describes the scenario of a twelve-year-old who declines testing: Extract 3 GC: I have had a twelve-year-old decline testing (.) his mother wanted him tested, went through the whole process, all assuming it was going to happen because it always goes ahead, this kid was deaf as well so it was really complicated counseling (.) and sitting in McDonalds I said, you're going to go ahead with the test? And he said, no (.) his mother looked at him and she was saying, oh, you do want the test, and he just was shaking his head, she said, oh it's because he's worried about needles, and I said, well (.) if you didn't have to have a needle would you have the test? Thinking we could do a cheek swab or something, he went, no, but he couldn't really tell us why he didn't want the test, but that was okay and thank goodness his mother was quite a reasonable person and she respected that and he came back 3 years later when he was ready, when his younger sister was coming in as well.
The expression 'all assuming it was going to happen because it always goes ahead' is suggestive that children routinely align with parental decisions. The twelve-yearold's disability adds further complications to communicating complex issues. GC skilfully reproduces the tension between herself, the child and the mother through reported speech ('I said', 'he said') and constructed dialogue. For instance, when the child initially declines the test ('he said no'), the mother is reported as attempting to direct the child to be tested, 'oh, you do want the test', thereby challenging the child's display of autonomy. The mother's persuasive stance in favour of testing is captured through reported speech ('oh it's because he's worried about needles'), which is skilfully neutralized by GC by suggesting that the test could be performed by other means ('I said, well (.) if you didn't have to have a needle would you have the test?'). The child declines but is unable to justify his reasons, which confirms GC's earlier point that minors do not display autonomy convincingly. The above scenario is couched as a counseling success story not because of the child's persistence in declining testing or even the complicated counseling involved, but because the coercive mother 'respected' the child's weak display of autonomy.
Generally, professionals raised the concern that it was difficult to assess the maturity of minors. Even measures such as Gillick competence were regarded as heavily reliant upon subjective judgments. Boddington and Gregory (2008) have recently argued that by privileging intellectual capacity Gillick judgements often overlook maturity and experience. The presumption that medical professionals are experts at 'doing autonomy' (i.e. the ability to make an informed and independent choice) was defended by one paediatrician when responding to the researcher's question about whether there is any benefit in testing children when they are 'younger'. His response below provides an interesting description of the dilemmas professionals face when assessing maturity: Extract 4 P: I think there's (.) I think kids end up carrying a lot of baggage anyway and I think to be lumbering and cumbering them with additional baggage for (.) which isn't going to-why spoil their childhood? If it's going to be bad news why spoil their childhood if it's not going to help them at all? (…) I don't think-I honestly don't think there's a right or wrong answer for what you should be doing, I like the idea that you shouldn't be testing or giving that information until they are mature enough to understand it (.) and you can always make a-come up with an example, why don't we just do that? But, I think you either have that rule or you don't and I suppose if you decided on that rule you're then left with some of the consequences of the, at some stage there's going to be this jarring (.) and adolescence is-is a difficult period but it's a difficult period for a number of reasons, a lot of which are that they're actually coming to realise things that they weren't aware of when they were children. (.) so I think it-I think adolescence is the time to start going through those issues, and I think to be telling a child, a young child, who particularly doesn't have the maturity to fully understand some of these concepts is difficult (.) but I think you could argue that that's a paternalistic view.
The benefits of testing are offset by casting the child as already overwhelmed by concerns that may compromise their autonomy: disclosing a genetic identity would simply add further anxiety ('additional baggage'). The rhetorical question 'why spoil their childhood?' suggests that revealing a future genetic identity may be psychosocially harmful. It also resonates with Davis' (1997) popular defence that children have a 'right to an open future'. An interesting characteristic of P's description of professional judgement is its flexibility and openness, although couched in ambivalence ('I don't think there's a right or wrong answer for what you should be doing'). For instance, the subjective confessional tone ('I honestly think…') builds the case that there is no absolute principle ('right or wrong answer') to guide professional decisions. Not testing until the child is older is not an iron clad law, but a preference ('I like the idea…') suggesting that judgements are subjective and context-dependent. The possibility of making rules or setting 'examples' is contrasted with the recognition that cases do not always fit the rule ('at some stage there's going to be this jarring'). By orienting to 'adolescence' as a 'difficult period' on the grounds that adolescents are growing in insight and understanding, it would be inappropriate to conduct testing any earlier. Thus P seems to be claiming that an optimal period for disclosing genetic information is when the 'child' is reaching psychological autonomy. Conceding that some adolescents are less autonomous than others is accounted for defensively. In signalling this 'paternalistic view' as a possible reading, P seems to anticipate potential disagreement about whether medical professionals are indeed experts in determining the autonomous status of children/adolescents.
Avoidance of Parental Responsibility
In contrast to scenarios where parents 'want to know' their child's genetic status, some professionals cited cases where parents 'don't want to know'. In these accounts, affected parents, or parents aware of familial risk, were cast as avoiding responsibility for disclosing genetic information that may have important medical or social consequences for their children. The two cases we present below are very different, but they are linked in terms of the temporal (future) consequences of not disclosing genetic information to children.
In Extract 5, a Paediatric Nephrologist (P) is explaining how families usually have to overcome 'some huge agenda' in relation to genetic responsibility. She describes 'a very interesting family' who were unable to engage in risk communication with their children. She begins describing the scenario by assigning character attributes to each of the parents: the father 'was a solicitor … a professional man' who was diagnosed with polycystic kidneys 'late in the stage of the disease' and the 'wife was an accountant' who felt 'absolutely incapacitated with guilt'. As we will see, framing the parents' character in this way has important rhetorical implications for imputing responsibility.
Extract 5 P: They didn't want correspondence, I can't remember all the things they didn't want but you know they were absolutely unable to broach the subject with the children. R: Yeah. P: And I think that, I mean the problem is it's never going to be right for them so really you know if you can't tell your children when you're 12 and, when they're 12 and when they're given an opportunity, they're not going to be able to do it, I think one was 15 and doing 'O' levels and you know. R: Right. P: I think we did see them twice. R: Yeah. P: And clearly the children are just going to find out themselves at some time, and I mean, one of the things is that you know say the children get married have babies and then they find that they've passed it on to their baby and nobody told them and they've got two intelligent parents who obviously knew.
In claiming that 'they didn't want correspondence', P is establishing the evasive conduct of the parents. Despite her gloss of events ('I can't remember all the things they didn't want'), this account conveys a complete parental failure to initiate risk communication (note the use of 'absolutely unable to broach…'). By framing the circumstances in absolute terms as far as the children's age is concerned ('it's never going to be right for them'), P seems to suggest that self-initiated disclosure is unlikely to occur once they miss the current 'opportunity'. Explicit reference to the children's age ('I think one was 15') is suggestive that they were probably competent enough to benefit from disclosure at the time. Furthermore, the statement 'I think we did see them twice' underscores that the parents were given opportunities to reconcile their guilt. The rest of the interaction is taken up by a prospective account of the ethical and genetic implications of failed disclosure. Framed as a self-evident scenario ('clearly the children…'), the paediatrician describes the hypothetical situation that the children will only learn of their carrier status once the mutation is passed onto their own children. The last two statements ('and nobody told them', 'they've got two intelligent parents') succeed in framing the blameworthiness of the parents as a cautionary tale: educated parents are expected to engage in responsible risk communication.
In the above account, deferring responsibility is largely posed as a moral judgement on the part of the parents to disclose risk. In the next account, we consider a similar scenario where parents have not disclosed genetic information and the adolescent in question has come to the clinic on her own. Unlike the previous account, the ethical dilemma below is posed as a clinical challenge for the Paediatric Endocrinologist (P) who has to explain to the '17-year-old girl' that she has male chromosomes: Extract 6 P: One of the things that made me realise that parents don't necessarily want to engage with us was my involvement with a 17-year-old girl who was referred to me because she had no secondary sex development (.) and she was tall so she clearly didn't have Turner Syndrome (.) anyway we did the usual full work up at 17, found that she had a 46 XY karyotype, so, you know, quite a big issue to deal with, bright, intelligent girl, planning to go to university, very articulate, had come to the clinic on her own, and I thought, ah shit, how am I going to deal with this? So I rang the GP and the GP was-by pure chance happened to be an ex trainee of mine from (place), and I knew that she'd done psychology before she came into medicine, and I said, look, you know, I'm feeling very uncomfortable about dealing with these issues with this girl because she came to the clinic on her own, these are big issues we've got to discuss, and I'm not clear why the family aren't supporting her.
The detection of a '46 XY karyotype' presents complex psychosocial issues about the girl's gender and identity. These issues are made all the more difficult by building the girl's character as autonomous: 'bright, intelligent girl, planning to go to university, very articulate, had come to the clinic on her own'. The self-reflective question 'how am I going to deal with this' is an effective display of professional responsibility and ambivalence (we will examine markers of uncertainty in more detail in the next section). The ethical dilemma is framed as follows: how does the professional convey sensitive genetic information without causing psychological harm? The remainder of the account is an attempt at resolution by recruiting the support of 'the GP' through the use of reported speech ('and I said look…'). In recasting the dilemma, P conveys his own personal difficulties of counseling the autonomous child ('I'm feeling very uncomfortable … because she came to the clinic on her own'). From P's account we notice that ethical burdens are communicated and shared with other professional colleagues, giving rise to unexpected strategies of resolution ('by pure chance [she] happened to be an extrainee of mine … she'd done psychology'). Furthermore, the absence of the parents is unusual and warrants an account ('I'm not clear why the family aren't supporting her').
So far, we have examined examples of ethical dilemmas which reconstruct the tensions between professionals, parents and children in matters of childhood testing. However, these cases also allude to ambivalence about the professionals' role. Professional ambivalence was often accounted for when resisting parental demands for testing or when counseling seemed to be at odds with the kind of support that families were seeking.
Recognition of Professional Uncertainty
In Extract 6, we noted how ambivalence arises when the professional is confronted by the autonomous adolescent. In Extract 4, the professional is explaining the difficulty of choosing the right time to disclose complex risk information to a young child. In the following example, a genetic counselor (GC) is narrating a 'very difficult' scenario involving a 'very aggressive, pushy' father who 'presented himself at clinic demanding that [his] children have carrier testing' for cystic fibrosis: GC: And why is that important to me? And I don't know because it is a bit of a struggle, there's part of me that wants him to recognise that what he's doing actually is about control, it's about his own anxiety and it actually isn't about the benefit of the children, is my belief (.) now I might be wrong.
R is probing whether the difficulty of consulting the 'demanding father' was an individual burden. The invitation to give a subjective account is opposed in favour of a speculative explanation ('maybe…') of the father's noncompliance (note the use of 'we' in 'what we think he should do' which defines the problem as collectively professional rather than individual). GC offers the 'simple' explanation that aggressive parents are difficult to counsel. She then develops the father's character as someone who has failed to distinguish his own needs from that of his children, who thereby seeks to 'control' his fears via testing, as we have seen in Extract 1. GC's self-reflective question-'And why is that important to me?'-presents a professional self who is divided ('There's part of me…') and ambivalent ('I don't know'). The 'struggle' she refers to harks back to the practical difficulty of managing parental rights and responsibilities. The formulation 'and it actually isn't about the benefit of the children' implies that the father would have argued this point. GC is claiming to know the father's real motivations (i.e. 'anxiety' and 'control') which seem to override the child's best interests. There are, however, a number of devices which mitigate professional certainty about the father's actual or presumed internal states: the father's 'anxiety' is offered as an opinion ('my belief'), while her final remark ('now I might be wrong') is offered as a concession. Mitigating this psychological assessment of the father not only signals professional ambivalence, but displays moderation about making absolute claims of character.
Ambivalence may also arise when professionals are sympathetic to the interests of parents. For instance, the same genetic counselor (GC) explained a composite (i.e. 'typical') case of a family requesting carrier testing under the circumstances where a child has 'died horribly' (from 'a metabolic problem') and the paediatrician 'has a close relationship with the family'. Uncertainty arises when two competing interests are at work: the professional wants to help the grieving family, but at the same time must refuse childhood testing on the grounds of autonomy. The dilemma of counseling a family who request a test after losing a child is powerfully conveyed by contrasting parental, professional and children's perspectives.
Extract 8
GC: Doing something is what you're trained to do, and then one has to say actually hang on a minute, not only have you lost a child and you feel you can give them this, we're actually going to say no, it's not a good idea because that's theirs to have for themselves, that's actually quite hard (.) you do-I do feel quite cruel sometimes R: Why?
GC: Because-quite brutal even, because sometimes you can see that these people are-or where they are for probably the best possible reasons (.) and they-but they haven't thought it through and you have to-R: And they don't know-GC: Yeah, and they just want to do something. R: Yeah.
GC: And you're saying well, actually I'm not going to let you because I'm going to make you sit and talk to me Here, GC is describing competing goals/sensibilities of the professional role: the professional is 'trained' to help by routinely 'doing something', but is immediately checked by an ethical standpoint ('and then one has to say actually hang on a minute'). The purpose of this contrast signals that the right thing to do is sometimes counter-intuitive. GC sympathetically weighs the concerns of the grieving family ('not only have you lost a child') with her own power to grant such a test (note the personal 'you feel you can give them this'), which is contrasted again with the professional standpoint ('we're actually going to say no'). The decision to withhold testing is justified in terms of the child's autonomy ('because that's theirs to have for themselves'). And while, ethically speaking, this may be the right thing to do, the counselor conveys ambivalence ('I do feel quite cruel sometimes') about what may seem to the family as not doing something. This tension between 'doing' and 'not doing' is developed in the remainder of the interaction. GC concedes that the family are requesting a test for 'the best possible reasons' but have not 'thought it through', which is justification for delaying action and offering counseling ('I'm going to make you sit and talk to me').
So far, we have examined cases of professional uncertainty where parents seem to be making 'unreasonable' demands or requests for childhood testing. In our final case below, we return to the scenario in Extract 1, where the dying mother has demanded that all five of her children be tested. Here, the source of professional uncertainty is not the difficulty of refusing a test, but how refusal of a test may amount to 'doing harm'.
Extract 9
GC: This woman, in fact, she was fairly cluey, she knew that with FAP you can sometimes get bony changes in the face, and so she watched those kids and she'd feel their scalps to see if they had any bones, and she'd decided which children were already positive and which weren't and was treating them accordingly (.) she was also fairly upfront about behaving a bit differently towards the ones-and that was quite a dilemma for me, because I was thinking, well, she's already behaving differently on her basis of her assumptions about testing, are we actually doing harm by not testing because maybe it is better for her to treat the children appropriate to their genetic risk rather than this presupposition of what they had (.) on the other hand her assessment could have been quite accurate as well.
An important aspect of recounting this scenario is the framing of the mother's conduct towards her children. The characterization of her perceptiveness ('she was fairly cluey') and her medical knowledge ('she knew … you can sometimes get bony changes in the face') construct a moral profile of the anxious mother. The potential harm of lay diagnosis is implied as the children may be needlessly subjected to the mother's medicalizing gaze. In signalling 'that was quite a dilemma for me', the counselor frames this dilemma by displaying her thinking: is it better to test knowing that the mother is treating (and possibly harming) the children on the basis of 'her assumptions about testing'? Professional ambivalence thus runs the risk of becoming professional indifference ('are we actually doing harm by not testing'). Though GC does not talk about ethical principles, she is weighing up the lesser of the two evils: comparing the potential for harm to the children from several different sources. Testing would mean that the mother could 'treat the children appropriate to their genetic risk' while also conceding that the mother's assessment might be 'quite accurate' given the testimony of her character. Recognising the strengths of the mother's perspective itself displays GC's good judgement-i.e. her professional ability to be reflective in practice and her moderation in making strong moral claims about clients.
Discussion
The focus of this study has been to understand the discoursal and rhetorical resources professionals draw upon to reflect upon ethical dilemmas. The professional accounts we have analysed are not simply post-hoc justifications of practice but examples of the kind of categorizations and moral judgements that professionals use contingently in situated encounters, which may shape subsequent responses and ethical decisions. We therefore view professional accounts as a performative and practical-moral activity made accessible within the research interview.
We agree with Bower et al. (2002: 184) that interviews 'yield more detailed descriptions of the types of ethical/ professional situations encountered' and our analytic themes certainly attest to the types of situations in which dilemmas over childhood testing emerge. For instance, the first three themes-juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child's autonomy, elicitation of the child's autonomy and avoidance of parental responsibility-foreground the professional agenda concerned with the child's right or ability to choose. In the first category, parents are critiqued for fulfilling their rights and wishes without properly considering the child's autonomy. This calls for professionals to adopt an advocacy position whereby the child's voice is heard so that testing might be delayed until they are autonomous enough to decide for themselves. In the second category, when children are closer to the age of majority, the issue becomes whether the professional can assess or elicit autonomy as the capacity to choose, given the extremely variable individual circumstances. Here, the professional must be satisfied that children can demonstrate capacity independently of parents. Assessing whether children were capable of making informed and independent decisions relied upon making subjective rather than rule-based judgements. In the third category, parental rights or responsibilities were largely absent or deferred, which posed difficulties for the child's autonomy. The abandonment of the autonomous child raises psychosocial concerns about failed risk communication and the absence of familial support for complex decision-making.
A notable characteristic of professional accounts are the ways in which descriptions of characters and events create a 'scenario' of ethical tensions between different parties. For example, the three-party tension (professional-parentschild) was the most common form of dilemma whereby counseling seeks to establish an alignment between all three parties. As we have seen, 'misalignment' (i.e. disagreement or disrupted communication) between professionals and children occurred when the latter were unable to perform or justify informed consent. Misalignment with parents occurred for numerous reasons, mainly because parents understood requests for genetic testing as a two-party activity (i.e. the child's perspective was ignored or not considered by the parents), while the role of the professional was to include and advocate the child's perspective as a component of ethical deliberation. Our analysis shows that tensions between parents and professionals are partly framed in terms of parental perceptions of testing. For instance, many of the practitioners we interviewed explained that parents often thought of childhood testing as a means of eliminating, not confirming, genetic risk. Once this anomaly of reasoning was pointed out, most parents accepted arguments in favour of the child's autonomy. In rare cases, however, professionals framed parental persistence as seeking to confirm fears of risk (cf. Extract 9). It is worth drawing attention to the fact that professionals and parents use different resources to justify their reasons for (not) testing. Professionals, as we have seen, tend to argue on behalf of the child's autonomy as a reason for delaying testing, while parents are inclined to argue in favour of the child's 'best interests' to justify requests for testing. Professional accounts must therefore show that moral-psychological motivations belie parental claims of the child's best interests. Moral assumptions about character and conduct impute hidden anxieties and motivations behind parental appeals to best interests.
While the themes we have uncovered are no doubt useful for categorizing and anticipating professional dilemmas, we believe that analytic attention should also be given to the way that such categories are discoursally and rhetorically constructed. Rhetorical Discourse Analysis, for instance, focuses on the way the professionals persuade others that certain characters and events are morally or ethically problematic and warrant reflection prior to intervention. Descriptions are therefore 'oriented' to the listener to sound credible, convincing and/or compelling to elicit both support and agreement. The most significant device we found was the use of extreme case formulation manifest through the use of contrast structures (Smith 1978) . Contrast devices facilitate the moral positioning of actors to assign responsibility or blame. For example, moral profiles of the 'pushy' mother, the 'aggressive' father, and the 'innocent' child are particularly effective in upgrading the seriousness of dilemmas and narrating cautionary tales: children should be treated as ends rather than means, parents have failed to 'think it through', etc. Contrast devices are also constructed through the categorization of events which justify professional action. The counselor's dilemma is more compelling, for instance, when parents are cast as 'demanding' rather than 'requesting' tests. Furthermore, contrast work is performed through the strategic recruitment of clients' voices, like the case of the 12-yearold child who declines testing despite the mother's coercive remarks (cf. Extract 3). Ethical explanations are more powerfully conveyed when the contrastive nature of characters, voices and events are encoded to depict 'extreme case scenarios'. Such accounts, we believe, bolster the justificatory role of professional accounts.
The last of our four themes-recognition of professional uncertainty-must be treated separately from the others because it is not specifically a dilemma concerning parental rights or the child's autonomy but a dilemma of professional conduct. As we have seen, professionals display ambivalence about the difficulties associated with counseling anxious parents ('And I don't know because it is a bit of a struggle'), denying testing to grieving families ('I do feel quite cruel sometimes'), or counseling the solitary teenager ('how am I going to deal with this?'). It is also worth noting that professionals were not particularly ambivalent about the application of ethical codes or principles but more explicitly concerned about the actual interactions in clinic when counseling for difficult or troubling cases. This suggests that, while the application of ethical codes can be a potential problem for professionals, the codes themselves are not the main source of professional ambivalence. As we have indicated, the unexpected contingencies and unintended consequences of clinical interactions with parents and children about testing are the most troubling aspects of everyday professional practice. Even when professionals know what principle or code to implement, accomplishing it through talk is accounted for as a practical, interactional difficulty. This leads us to suggest that professional ambivalence concerning the ethical dilemmas of childhood testing is manifest locally and in a contextspecific fashion rather than primarily as a competition between ethical principles per se.
Implications for Practice
In this paper we have seen that categories and characterizations form part of the practical-moral activity of professional accounting for difficult cases. While value-neutrality is not a realistic objective for professional conduct, professionals should be critically reflective of the assumptions and biases that organise and inform their thinking. Professionals elicit support from colleagues by communicating with them about such cases; there is a risk, therefore, that they may exaggerate and distort the moral aspects of cases to justify their own professional conduct. This tendency can be remedied by actively promoting strategies for professional self-awareness. Possible strategies for raising awareness include practice dialogues that focus on how practitioners handle ethical dilemmas, peer group critique in which difficult cases are reinterpreted and debated, and group discussions of transcribed consultations.
In addition, there are aspects of the ethical cases presented here that indicate that conflicts might be avoided by adopting a more facilitative role. From the cases we have selected, it might be construed that the only role for professionals is that of gatekeeping access to genetic services, particularly in the context of childhood testing. There is indeed a lesson to be learnt that resistance to requests (gatekeeping) will provoke families to push harder for what they want, resulting in entrenched conflicts. We have deliberately selected cases in which a facilitative approach has evidently failed and where a standoff between the autonomy of parents and children is a matter of professional concern. Adopting a more facilitative approach is clearly important when there are ethical and practical uncertainties about how early predictive testing should be performed on children for whom there is a clear medical benefit. In Britain, there is an ongoing discussion about when the rigid application of guidelines in these cases may be unhelpful.
Limitations of the Study and Future Research
It must be remembered that our study has only considered the views of professionals. Given that ethical dilemmas are jointly constructed in situated encounters, we would have benefited from the views of parents to gain a sense of how ethical issues are understood from different perspectives. While it is analytically interesting in its own right to examine the rhetorical and moral resources that professionals use to understand past ethical cases, a future study might usefully triangulate parental, professional and children's accounts vis-à-vis what transpires within a counseling encounter. In terms of medical education and professional development, naturalistic recordings of clinical encounters would offer more powerful illustrations of how ethical dilemmas are interactionally negotiated and managed Clarke 2002, Sarangi et al. 2009 ).
Conclusion
In conclusion, professional ethical dilemmas reside not in knowing what code to implement when, but in how to accomplish professional ethics through clinical interactions. It is therefore suggested that more attention is needed to facilitate 'interactional expertise' as the basis of managing difficult and challenging encounters. For health care professionals and medical education, it is not enough to know what ethical principles are; it is also necessary to explore a variety of interactional and dilemma-specific scenarios in which different resolution or avoidance strategies can be developed and assessed.
